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Abstract
Few of us give much thought to local laws, yet local laws, such
as zoning and other land use regulations, have an abiding
infl,uence on our lives. Think for a few moments about the types of
businesses located near your home. Are these businesses places you
frequent? Considering socio-economics, how do land uses differ
from locale to locale throughout your city or state? Do all citizens
have an equal voice in the land use approval process? The answer
is likely no, which creates environmental and economic justice
issues.
Like all businesses, when it comes to payday lenders,
geography matters. Payday lenders and other high-cost loan
providers charge between 300% to 1,000% interest on consumer
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loans, a fact that concerns many consumer advocates. For decades,
we have known another disturbing fact - by locating storefronts in
neighborhoods frequented by certain demographic groups, payday
lenders and other providers of high-cost credit target people of
color, low-income and moderate-income Americans, military
personnel, and the elderly. What we did not know until now,
however, was whether this targeting succeeds in increasing loan
usage by these groups.
This Article examines the extent to which living near a payday
lender increases the likelihood that a consumer will use one. A
growing body of literature examines the possible spatial patterns of
alternative financial services, but here we add to that literature by
explicitly exploring the relationship between distance and density
of payday loan stores and consumer use of such loans. The study
described in this Article finds that consumers who live closer to
payday lenders are more likely to use the loans and that if a
consumer lives near more than one, he or she is even more likely to
use the loans. The study results suggest local payday loan
ordinances that limit the number of lenders, or forbid lenders from
certain areas, effectively limit the harm caused by such high-cost
loans.
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INTRODUCTION

As geographer Waldo Tobler famously noted, "everything is
related to everything else" but near things are more related than
distant things. 1 In other words, geography matters. In the law,
geography is often controlled by local ordinances rather than state
or federal laws. Fed up with a lack of regulatory efforts at the
state or federal level, many consumer advocates concerned about
payday loan abuses are turning to local laws to curb abusive
payday loan practices. Our study shows that these efforts are
likely to bear fruit in the form of meaningful payday loan reform
that might reduce unconscionable payday loan practices.
Think for a few moments about the types of businesses
located near your home. How did these businesses arrive in your
neighborhood? In other words, who approved them for this
location and why? Considering socio-economics, how do land uses
differ from locale to locale throughout your city or state? Do all
citizens have an equal voice in the land use approval process? The
answer is likely no, which creates environmental and economic
justice issues. People who control which businesses appear in
communities have significant influence on the everyday lives of
those who live there, perhaps much more influence than most of
us have previously understood.
Local lawmakers should think long and hard about zoning
and other local land use regulation, given the broad influence of
these regulations on society. 2 Mayors, city council members, and
city planners now have evidence that the business and other uses
such as parks and community centers they approve for their cities,
have an impact on citizen well-being. Perhaps it is obvious that
approving a license or zoning application for a liquor store, a fast
food restaurant, a payday lender, or a bar will result in more use
of those businesses. Conversely, it makes sense to assume that
installing parks, basketball courts, health food stores, grocery
stores and community gardens will improve well-being to a

1 Waldo Tobler, A Computer Movie Simulating Urban Growth in the Detroit
Regwn, 46 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 234, 236 (1970).
2 Nathalie Martin & Robert N. Mayer, What Communities Can Do to Rein in
Payday Lending: Strategies for Successful Local Ordinance Campaigns Through a
Texas Lens, 80 L. & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 147, 175 (2017).
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greater extent than liquor stores, bars or payday lenders. 3 In this
Article, we test this broad hyp othesis in the context of the
geography of payday loan stores as this geography affects payday
loan usage. In so doing, we provide valuable data for mayors, city
councils, and city planners who wish to be more proactive in
improving the health and well-being of communities across our
nation.
Payday, title and high-cost installment lenders may charge
interest rates from 100% per annum to 1100% per annum. 4 While
some scholars laud these lenders as godsends for people with poor
credit and few other options, many others in society fear that the
lenders ultimately do most consumers more harm than good. 5
Although there are a number of exceptions, federal legislation
requires lenders disclose their interest rates on an annual basis,
meaning lenders must tell consumers the interest they are
charging. 6 Nevertheless, these interest rates are often obfuscated
if not completely hidden from consumers. 7
There is no federal interest rate cap on consumer loans,
except for loans made to military personnel and their families, in
which case lenders can charge only 36% or less per annum. 8 In
3 See Lee R. Maheswaran, The Health Benefits of Urban Green Spaces: A Review of
the Evidence, 33 J. PUB. HEALTH 212, 212 (2011) (''Most studies reported findings that
generally supported the view that green space have a beneficial health effect."). See
generally Deborah A. Cohen et al., Contribution of Public Parks to Physical Activity, 97

AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 509 (2007) (evidencing the critical role parks play in facilitating
physical activity in minority communities).
4 See Nathalie Martin, 1,000% Interest-Good While Supplies Last: A Study of
Payday Loan Practices and Solutions, 62 ARIZ. L. REV. 563, 564 n.1 (2010) [hereinafter
Martin, 1,000% Interest] (''The [payday] loans on which we gathered data ranged in
interest rates from 100% per annum to 1100% per annum.").
6

Why,

Compare Payday Lending in America: Who Borrows, Where They Borrow, and
PEW
CHARITABLE
TRUST,
(July
19,
2012),
available
at

https://www.pewtrusts.org/research-and-analysis/reports/2012/07/19/who-borrows
where-they-borrow-and-why [hereinafter PEW CHARITABLE TRUST, Payday Lending]
with Martin, supra note 4, at 664.
6 Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f (2012).
7 See, e.g., James v. Nat'l Fin. LLC, 2014 WL 6845560 (Del. Ch. 2014).
8 See 10 U.S.C. §987(a)-(b) (2012) ("A creditor who extends consumer credit to a
covered member of the armed forces or a dependent of such a member . . . may not
impose an annual percentage rate of interest greater than 36 percent with respect to
the consumer credit extended . . ."); 32 C.F.R. §232.4(b) (2016) ("A creditor may not
impose an [Military Annual Percentage Rate] greater than 36 percent in connection
with an extension of consumer credit that is closed-end credit or in any billing cycle for
open-end credit.").
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2007, a bipartisan Congress enthusiastically passed the Military
Lending Act, after evidence emerged that high-cost loans like
payday and title loans were interfering with military readiness. 9
Military personnel and their families are now protected by the
36% federal interest rate cap, but what about the rest of us?
Concern over harm to consumers caused state legislators, city
councils, religious and consumer groups to look for alternatives to
federal legislation to curb abuses in this controversial industry. 10

These non-federal legal actions include state legislation, among
other patchwork solutions. 11
Legal scholars, geographers and others have empirically
shown that lenders offering payday loans, title loans and high-cost
installment loans often locate their stores outside military bases
and in low-income and minority neighborhoods.12 Scholars also
9 See Steven M. Graves & Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Lending and the
Military: The Law and Geography of Payday Loans Military Towns, 66 OHIO ST. L. J.

663, 832 (2006).
10 See PEW CHARITABLE TRUST, Payday Lending, supra note 6; What The People
Think Of Payday Lending, PYMNTS.COM, (Apr. 26, 2017), available at
https://www.pymnts.com/news/alternative-financial-services/2017/pew-charitable
trusts-payday-lending-figures-short-term-loans-cfpb-regulation/.
11 Nathalie Martin, Public Opinion and The Limits of State Law: The Case for a
Federal Usury Cap, 34 N. ILL. L. REV. 259, 273 (2014) [hereinafter Martin, Public

Opinion].
12 See, e.g., Graves & Peterson, supra note 9, at 832 (evidencing payday lenders
target military personnel); Steven M. Graves, Landscapes of Predation, Landscapes of
Neglect: A Location Analysis of Payday Lenders and Banks, 66 PROF. GEOGRAPHER 303,
312 (2003) [hereinafter Graves, Landscapes] (suggesting the payday lending industry

targets neighborhoods with a higher percentage of poor and minority residents);
William C., Apgar, Jr., & Christopher E. Herbert, Subprime Lending and Alternative
Financial Service Providers: A Literature Review and Empirical Analysis, U.S. DEF'T
HOUSING & URB. DEV. OFF. POL'y DEV. & RES. Ill, Il60-1 (2004) (alternative financial
service providers are highly concentrated in lower income neighborhoods and in
neighborhoods where Hispanics comprise a si gnificant share of the population);
Kenneth Temkin & Noah Sawyer, Analysis of Alternative Financial Service Providers,
FANNIE
MAE
FOUND.
(2004),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/410936-Analysis-of
Alterna tive-Financial-Service-Providers.PDF (alternative financial service providers
cluster in minority and low-income neighborhoods); Wei Li, et al., Predatory Profiling:
The Role of Race and Ethnicity in the Location of Payday Lenders in California, CTR.
FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING (2009),
http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/research-analysis/predatory
profiling.pdf (racial and ethnic composition of neighborhoods is the primary predicator
of payday lending locations); Robin A. Prager, Determinants of the Locations of Payday
Lenders, Pawnshops and Check-Cashing Outlet, 46 R. INDUS. ORG. 21, 37-38 (2014);
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have demonstrated that customers of these lenders do not shop
around for price when choosing loan but typically choose a lender
based upon location or a third-party recommendation. 1 3 Perhaps it
is no surprise that living near one or more payday lending
establishments increases the likelihood that a consumer will use
these loans. Three of the authors - a geographer and two social
workers - devised a study to test the premise that having payday
lender(s) in the neighborhood increases payday loan usage by
neighborhood residents. This Article describes that study, the first
empirical study to establish definitively that living near payday
loan establishments increase the likelihood that a consumer will
use the loans. The study has important implications for both state
legislatures and local governments who seek to limit the number
stores in a particular place or prohibit payday lenders entirely.
Whether in favor or opposed to regulating payday loans, few
people argue payday loan stores increase the panache of a
neighborhood. Indeed, in recent years, payday loans have joined
the ever-ubiquitous liquor stores, 14 limited nutritious food stores, 15
and toxic waste dumps16 that have always proliferated in
disadvantaged communities. Payday loans are cash advances
made with the promise of a payback with interest, following
receipt of the borrower's next paycheck. Unfortunately, the arrival
of payday rarely makes paying the loan easy. The loans are easy
to take out but hard to repay. High interest rates add up quickly,
and while the loans are framed as term loans that can be repaid in
short order, they are designed to continue extracting the bi-weekly

Ellen S. Schultz & Theo Francis, High-Interest Lenders Tap Elderly, Disabled, WALL
STREET J. (Feb. 12, 2008), http://www.wsj.com/artic1es/SB120277630957260703
(payday lenders cluster around government-subsidized housing and the disabled).
13 PEW CHARITABLE TRUST, Payday Lending, supra note 5, at 15.
14 See Greg Hinz, Potent Mix: Liquor, Poverty, CRAIN'S CHICAGO Bus. (Jan. 18,
1997),
http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/19970118/ISSUEO1/10005751/potent
mix (''Low-income, minority neighborhoods and suburbs are far more likely to be home
to package liquor stores than middle-to-upscale white areas.").
16 See Kelly M. Bower, et al., The Intersection of Neighborhood Racial Segregation,
Poverty, and Urbanicity and Its Impact on Food Store Availability in the United States,
58 PREVENTIVE MED. 33, 35-38 (2014) (the number of convenience stores increases as
the level of neighborhood poverty increases).
16 See Evan J. Ringquist, Equity and the Distribution of Environmental Risk: The
Case of TRI Facilities, 78 Soc. Ser. Q. 811, 826-27 (1997).
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fee. In other words, most are not designed to be repaid.17
Refinancing, sometimes many times over, is often inevitable due
to the short-term and non-amortizing structure of the loans.
Consumer borrowers plunge deeper and deeper into debt, which
further erodes borrowers' financial stability and opportunities to
create wealth.18 Initially, these loans seem attractive to low and
moderate-income consumers with weaker credit histories, because
they require no credit check and are relatively quick to arrange,
but borrowers learn quickly that the loans have a deep, dark
side.19
In the absence of the federal regulation of payday loans,
states attempt to control the use of these high interest loans by
either limiting the amount of interest charged or capping the
number and amount of loans an individual may take out.20 In
addition to state action, some local governments enact ordinances
zoning the density of payday loan shops within an area through
the use of anti-concentration ordinances, the distance of store
locations from residential areas, or to impose other geographical
and non-geographical limitations.21

17 PEW CHARITABLE TRUST, Payday Lending, supra note 5, at 15 (Lenders say in
their marketing materials that the loans are not designed for long-term use, but this is
untrue. The loans are designed for long-term use. Indeed, the average borrower is
indebted for payday loans five to seven months a year).
18 Younghee Lim, et al., Payday Loan Use and Consumer Well-Being: What
Consumers and Social Workers Need to Know about Payday Loans, 18 J. POVERTY 379,
390 (2014).
19

Id.

20 See Signe-Mary McKernan, et al., Prohibitions, Price Caps, and Disclosures: A
Look at State Policies and Alternative Financial Product Use, 95 J. ECON. BEHAV. &
ORG. 207, 213 (2013).
21 See Graves, Landscapes, supra note 12, at 309; Sheila Foster, Breaking Up
Payday: Anti-Agglomeration Zoning and Consumer Welfare, 75 OHIO ST. L. J. 57, 76-78
(2014); see generally Amy Lavine, Zoning Out Payday Loan Stores and Other
Alternative
Financial
Services
Providers
(July
13,
2011),
http://papers. ssrn. corn/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=l 885197 (unpublished manuscript)
(overviewing approaches local governments have taken to regulate alternative
financial service providers); Kelly Griffith, et. al., Controlling the Growth of Payday

Lending Through Local Ordinances and Resolutions: A Guide for Advocacy Groups and
Government
Officials
(2012),

http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/Resources.PDL.LocalOrdinanceManual11.13.12. pelf.
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While research on the effects of state and local payday loan
laws is limited and findings are mixed, 22 our study differs from
past studies by examining the relationship between the distance
and density of payday loan stores and consumer use of payday
loans. Exploration of this relationship informs policymakers about
the efficacy of location and density regulations as a means of
protecting the consumer.
Part II of this Article describes the legal landscape of payday
loans and other high-cost loan and also describes the various types
of loans and how this variation developed. 23 This Part describes
the history of usury in the United States and the ways in which
states and local government attempt to regulate payday loans, in
light of federal inaction. Part III describes the bifurcation of U.S.
financial markets and explains how the geography theories of
distance decay and localization economies affect payday
markets. 24 Part IV describes our study methodology and results. 25
In Part V, we conclude with lessons for local policy makers on how
our data can be used to create meaningful local payday loan
ordinances, which can in turn improve the lives of people in our
towns and cities nationwide. 26

I. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE: TYPES OF HIGH-COST LOANS,
USURY LAWS, AND REGULATION OF HIGH-COST LOANS

Current regulation of payday and other high-cost loans are
the worst kind of regulation - extensive but not effective. 27 This
regulation takes up a great deal of space in the legal landscape
but is designed to be neither effective nor efficient. Rather, lenders
lobby for laws that appear thoughtful and rigorous but are
Compare Christopher S. Fowler, et al., The Geography of Fringe Banking, 64 J.
REGIONAL Ser. 688, 703 (2014) (explaining local and state regulatory environment does
not affect the total number of payday loan establishments), and Temkin & Sawyer,
supra note 12, at 27-8, with McKernan, et. al. supra note 20, at 216 (contending state
regulations effectively regulate use of alternative financial services and payday
lenders), and James R., Barth, et. al., Do State Regulations Affect Payday Lender
Concentration?, 84 J. ECON. & Bus. 14, 23-4 (2016) (same).
23 See infra notes 27-83 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 84-116 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 117-33 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 134-40 and accompanying text.
27 Martin, Public Opinion, supra note 11, at 273.
22
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neither. 28 As explained below, historically, regulating high-cost
consumer credit was left primarily to the states. A few federal
laws also apply, making the resulting patchwork a complex
labyrinth. 29 Local governments, fed up with inaction on state and
federal level, joined the party, leading to a third level of
regulation. 30 These developments are discussed in detail in this
section, along with a description of usury laws and the various
types of high-cost loans in the marketplace today.

A. Types of High-Cost Loans
While our study measures only the use of traditional payday
loans, knowledge of the fragmented market helps us regulate
high-cost credit in the future. Lenders design a variety of high
cost loans that provide access to people who may not have access
to credit, often at rates of 300 - 1,000% interest or more. 31 Terms of
different loan products vary greatly. One example is the "payday"
loan, so named because its original purpose was to help a
customer survive a short-term cash flow crisis between now and
payday. 32 In a typical payday loan, a consumer borrows money at
a rate of between $15 and $25 per $100 for a period of fourteen
days or less. 33 In other words, if a consumer was paid four days
ago but is already out of cash, she can go borrow, for example,
28

See id.

Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f (2018); Electronic Funds
Transfer Act, 1 5 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (2018).
30 See generally Martin & Mayer, supra note 2.
31 Martin, 1,000% Interest, supra note 4, at 586-90; From Payday to Small
29

Installment Loans: Risks, Opportunities, and Policy Proposals for Successful Markets,

PEW CHARITABLE TRUST (Aug. 2016), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and
[hereinafter
analysis/issue-briefs/2016/08/from •payday-to-small-installment-loans
From Payday to Small Installment Loans] ("The trend among payday and auto title
lenders toward offering installment loans is being driven by three factors: consumer
preference, regulatory pressure, and lenders' effort to avoid consumer protections put
in place for lump-sum payment loans.").
32 See Ronald J. Mann & Jim Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. REV. 855,
857 (2007) (explaining the mechanics of a typical payday loan); Karen E. Francis, Note,

Rollover, Rollover: A Behavioral Law and Economics Analysis of the Payday Loan
Industry, 88 TEX. L. REV. 611, 611-12 (2010) (describing a payday loan transaction);
Martin, 1,000% Interest, supra note 4, at 564 (Payday loans "were originally designed

to tide a consumer over until payday, and then be paid back in one lump sum when the
consumer received her paycheck.").
33 Martin, 1,000% Interest, supra note 4, at 564.
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$400 between now and her next payday (now ten days away). To
receive the $400 at a $15 per $ 100 rate she needs a checking
account and writes a check, or authorizes an automatic debit, for
$460 post-dated to her next payday. 34 When payday comes, she
can either let the check or debit clear, assuming the unlikely event
that she now has this money, or she can go in and pay another $60
to borrow the same $400 for the next two weeks. This loan carries
an annual interest rate of 390% or more.
Another loan type is the longer high-cost "installment loan[,]"
created to skirt state laws enacted to curb the classic difficult-to
pay, short-term, non-amortizing, payday loan. 35 In one such
installment loan, a customer borrows $100, to be repaid in twenty
six bi-weekly installments of $40. 16 each, plus a final installment
of $55.34. 36 In total, this borrower pays a total of $1,099.7 1 on a
$100 loan. The annual percentage rate on the loan is 1, 147%. 37
Another type of high-cost loan is the auto title loan, for which
consumers do not need bank accounts. 38 Rather borrowers simply
need an unencumbered automobile to secure the loan. These loans
carry a typical interest rate of 25% per month or 300% per
annum. 39 While title loans typically carry lower interest rates
See id.
See generally From Payday to Small Installment Loans, supra note 31.
36 See State v. B & B Investment Group, No. D-0lOl0CV-2009-01916, ii 7 (N.M.
Dec. 3, 2010). See also Felix Salmon, Loan Sharking Datapoints of the Day, REUTERS
(Jan.
7,
2010),
http://blogs.reuters. com/felix-salmon/2010/01/07/loan-sharking
datapoints-of-the-day/.
37 See B & B Investment Group, No. D-0lOlOCV-2009-01916 at ,i 7. See also
Salmon, supra note 36. This assumes lender is unable to convince borrower to re
borrow the principal before the loan is repaid.
38 See Auto Title Loans: Market Practices and Borrowers' Experiences, PEW
CHARITABLE
TRUSTS
5-6
(Mar.
2015),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2015/03/autotitleloansreport.pdf [hereinafter
Auto Title Loans] (noting that title loans tend to be larger than payday loans on
average); Jim Hawkins, et al., Dude, Where's My Car Title?: The Law, Behavior, and
Economics of Title Lending Markets, 2014 Ill. L. Rev. 1013, 1035 (2014) (noting study
results that only 56% of title loans customers surveyed appeared to have bank
relationships). See generally Nathalie Martin & Ozymandias Adams, Grand Theft Auto
Loans: Repossession and Demographic Realities in Title Lending, 77 Mo. L. REV. 41
(2012) (analyzing empirical data associated with auto title loans).
39 See Hawkins, et. al., supra note 38, at 1014-15 ("The most common term for the
[title] loan is one month, the interest rate charged is commonly around 300% (when
expressed as an annual percentage rate) . . ."); Martin & Adams, supra note 38, at 48
(concluding interest rates for title loans are typically 100%-300% per annum).
34
35
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than payday loans, they may be larger loans, increasing the
difficulty to repay and creating debt traps.40 Title loans also
subj ect borrowers to the possibility of losing their vehicle, a risk
not encountered with the other forms of high-cost loans described
here. In a prior study, one of the authors found that in one year in
New Mexico, as many as 71 % of title loan borrowers lost their cars
to repossession. 41 Our study, described in Part IV, analyzed only
traditional payday loan use, which was the predominant type of
high-cost loan used in Louisiana at the time of our data collection.

B. History of U.S. Usury Laws
Until recently, most U.S. states had usury laws that capped
interests on consumer loans. 42 Usury laws date back to the
earliest civilizations and are one of the simplest ways to protect
consumers from harsh credit practices. 43 Even Adam Smith, the
father of modern economic theory, believed interest rate caps were

40 Constance Brinkley-Badgett, Title Loans vs. Payday Loans: A Side-by-Side
Comparison,
CREDIT.COM,
February
2,
2016,
available
at
https://blog.credit.com/2016/02/title-loans-vs-payday-loans-a-side-by-side-comparison
(last accessed on February 24, 2019)(stating that "title loan amounts are about $1,000
versus $375 for payday loans, the survey found. This is one reason that the estimated
$1,200 spent annually by an average title loan borrower on fees is more than twice the
$520 spent a year by an average payday loan borrower ...").
See also Hawkins et al., supra note 38, at 1041 {Professor Jim Hawkins and his
coauthors found that borrowers do not fully understand the costs associated with title
loans. The people he surveyed did not exhibit an understanding of the high relative
cost of title loans compared to credit card debt. Only 25.71% (n = 9) recognized that a
title loan is a lot more expensive than credit card debt, while 17.14% (n = 6) thought a
title loan is a lot less expensive than credit card debt. 5. 71% (n = 2) thought a title loan
was a little less expensive than credit card debt, and 31.43% (n = 11) thought the two
were about the same cost. While this small sample of people may not be indicative of
borrowers generally, it is disturbing how few people understood the relative cost of
their title loan.).
41 Martin & Adams, supra note 38, at 45 ("[O]ur research shows that as many as
71% of the title loan customers have their vehicles repossessed.").
42 See Martin, Public Opinion, supra note 11, at 263; Christopher L. Peterson,
Usury Law, Payday Loans, and Statutory Sleight of Hand: Salience Distortion in
American Credit Pricing Limits, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1110, 1111 (2008) [hereinafter
Peterson, Usury Law].
43 Peterson, Usury Law, supra note 42, at 1113 ("Usury law, 'the oldest continuous
form of commercial regulation,' dates back to the earliest recorded civilizations and
continues to constrain payday lending in many American states.").
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a good idea. 44 Interest rate caps remained more or less in place
throughout the United Sates until the Supreme Court's decision in
Marquette National Bank v. First Omaha Service Corp., 45 in which
"the Supreme Court was asked to decide which state's usury law
applies when a national bank lends money to a consumer in
another state--that of the consumer or that of the bank."46 When
the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the bank's state rate
applied, states began eliminating their usury caps in order to
attract financial institutions to their states, with South D akota
and Delaware eliminating their caps first. 47 The decision
effectively deregulated state interest rate caps, allowing national
banks headquartered in a state without usury caps to export their
lack of an interest rate cap on consumers in any state. 48 State
lenders soon lobbied Congress for the same right, which Congress
granted. 49 Thereafter, banks could charge customers whatever
rate they liked.50

44
Christopher L. Peterson, "Warning: Predatory Lender"-A Proposal for Candid
Predatory Small Loan Ordinances, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 893, 931-32 (2012)
[hereinafter Warning: Predatory Lender] (discussing Adam Smith's lack of confidence

in the efficiency of consumer finance markets and that "[U]sury limits should be set
'somewhat above . . . the lowest market rate."').
46 Marquette Nat'l Bank v. First Omaha Serv. Corp. , 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
46 See Martin, Public Opinion, supra note 11, at 264 n. 21 (quoting Professor Amy
Schmitz) ("The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the National Bank Act
("NBA") to allow national and state chartered banks and thrifts to 'export' favorable
laws from their home states in order to circumvent less-favorable laws in other states
where they do business . . . [meaning] that a bank chartered in Delaware may impose
its interest rates on consumers in Colorado without worry about Colorado usury rate
laws. Payday lenders use this to their advantage by affiliating with banks in states
allowing for higher rates, and banks have started payday loan subsidiaries. Internet
and out-of-state payday lenders seek to use the dormant commerce clause to challenge
states' imposition of regulations on those who lend to their citizens.").
47 See Peterson, Usury Law, supra note 42, at 1 121-22.
4s See id. at 1122.
49
60

See id.
See id.
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C. Regulation of High- Cost Loans

1. Federal Law on High-Cost Loans
No federal laws regulate the specific terms of consumer loans.
However, the federal Truth in Lending Act applies to all loans, 51
and the federal Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 52 applies to online
lending. 53 While we do have a federal agency in charge of
regulating transparency and fairness in consumer financial
transactions, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(CFPB), 64 the future of the CFPB is in a state of flux following the
2016 presidential election. 55 At the moment, the CFPB regulates
banks, credit unions, securities firms, payday lenders, mortgage
servicing operations, foreclosure relief services, debt collectors and
other financial companies operating in the United States, but
lacks authority to set interest rate caps on payday loans or any
other credit product. 56
Congress unquestionably has the power to set federal interest
rate caps. In 2007, Congress passed the Military Lending Act
Truth in Lending Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1601- 1667f (2006).
Electronic Funds Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (2006).
63 Electronic Funds Transfer Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (2006).
64 See Jared Elosta, Dynamic Federalism and Consumer Financial Protectwn: How
the Dodd-Frank Act Changes the Preemptwn Debate, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1273, 1273 (2011)
(quoting 12 U.S.C.A. § 5511 ("[D]odd-Frank [Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act] . . . created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ("CFPB" or
"Bureau"), whose mission is to ensure 'that markets for consumer financial products
and services are fair, transparent, and competitive."). See also H.R. 4173, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (July 21, 2010) (detailing the CFPB's creation was authorized
by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the "Dodd
Frank Act"), and its passage in 2010 was a legislative response to the financial crisis of
2007-08 and the subsequent Great Recession).
66 See Steve Vockrodt, CFPB Drops Kansas Payday Lending Case, Stoking Fears
Trump is Backing Off the Industry, KANSAS CITY STAR (Jan 19, 2018),
(Mick
http://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-government1articlel96623824.html
Mulvaney, the acting director of the CFPB, requested no funds from second quarter of
the 2018 budget, and under his leadership, the agency dropped lawsuits against four
Kansas payday lenders). See also Hannah Levintova, Consumer Protectwn Bureau
Ends Investigation of Company that Donated to Leader's Campaigns, MOTHER JONES
(Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2018/01/consumer-protection
bureau-ends-investigation-of-company-that-donated-to-leaders-campaigns/ (in 2018,
CFPB also dropped a four-year investigation of payday lender World Acceptance Corp.).
66 Nathalie Martin, Regulating Payday Loans: Why This Should Make the CFPB's
Short List, 2 HARV. Bus. L. REV. ONLINE 44, 48 (2011) [hereinafter Martin, Regulating
61

62

Payday Loans] .
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(MLA), 57 which placed a 36% interest rate cap on consumer loans
prohibited lenders from engaging in predatory practices toward
active-duty military members and their dependent family
members. 58 Military leaders, deeply concerned about the effects of
predatory lending on military readiness, realizing state
lawmakers' inability or unwillingness to pass laws protecting the
troops, focused their efforts on passing federal legislation. 59 In
2006, the United States Department of Defense issued a report
finding that predatory lending undermines military readiness,
harms the morale of troops and their families, and adds to the cost
of fielding an all volunteer [sic] fighting force."6° Congress noted
that lenders were blatantly targeting the military by clustering in
large numbers "near military bases" and using "military-sounding
names." 61 Congress also found that many military personnel
lacked sophistication in financial matters and were easily taken
advantage of. 62 While the original MLA contained many
loopholes, which lenders quickly took advantage of, these
loopholes have now been closed for the most part. 63
67 See 10 U.S.C. §987(a)-(b) (2016) ("A creditor who extends consumer credit to a
covered member of the armed forces or a dependent of such a member . . . may not
impose an annual percentage rate of interest greater than 36 percent with respect to
the consumer credit extended . . ."); 32 C.F.R. §232.4(b) (2015) ("A creditor may not
impose an [Military Annual Percentage Rate] greater than 36 percent in connection
with an extension of consumer credit that is closed-end credit or in any billing cycle for
open-end credit.").
68 10 u.s.c. § 987(b) (2016).
69 U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING PRACTICES DIRECTED AT
MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THEIR DEPENDENTS, 9 (2006),
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/Report_to_Congress_final.pdf.
60
61

Id.
See Graves & Peterson, supra note 9, at 698 (identifying the types of businesses

targeting military personnel around military bases by conducting electronic searches);
id. at 668-72 (discussing U.S. senators argued payday loans interfered with military
preparedness by interfering with security clearances and also by making it so that
soldiers cannot devote their attention to their jobs). This in turn negatively affects their
performance. As explained by Republican Representative Walter Jones, Jr., '"[w]hen
relatively unsophisticated borrowers are unable to readily repay a loan from these
lenders, they can become consumed with worries over their debt and this undercuts
their abilities to fulfill their military duties." 151 CONG. REC. El487-01 (July 14, 2005)
(statement of Rep. Jones).
62 Graves & Peterson, supra note 9, at 668-72.
63
Carol Thompson, Loopholes Closed in Military Lending Act, VERITAS NEWS
NETWORK (July 23, 2015), http://veritasnews.com/loopholes-closed-in-military-lending
act/.
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2. State Laws on High-Cost Lending
Whether to have a usury cap is left to states and some states
still cap interest on all consumer loans. 64 For example, most states
along the eastern seaboard cap the amount of interest and fees a
lender may charge for consumer loans in a way that is "undiluted"
and "trim. "66 In other words, no lender may charge more than 18%
or 36% for a loan of any kind. These type of laws are referred
herein as laws with "true caps."
In most of the country, however, true caps are rare. More
specifically, fifteen states and the District of Columbia either
forbid payday lending or cap interest rates in a fashion that
makes lending undesirable.66 The rest of the states have either no
regulation of consumer loans, have regulations that affirmatively
allow the high-cost products described above, or have piecemeal
laws that apply to one or more of the various types of loans. 67 The
resulting legislative patchwork keeps legislatures and consumer
protections organizations busy around the clock, but has not
resulted in any overall decrease in high-cost loans or in interest
rates on such loans. To the contrary, the high-cost lending
industry is growing exponentially, faster than any other part of
the consumer credit sector. 68
64 Lauren K Saunders, Why 36%?:The History, Use, and Purpose of the36% Interest
Rate Cap, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, at 3, April 2013, available at

https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/why36pct.pdf (last accessed on February 23,
2019).
66 Peterson, Usury Law, supra note 42, at 111 7.
66 Saunders, supra note 6 3, at 3. The following states ban or cap payday loans at
36% or less: Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Georgia, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and West Virginia.
67 Predatory Small-Dollar Lending Protections, PROSPERITY NOW SCORECARD
(2016),
http://scorecard.prosperitynow.org/2016/measure/predatory-small-dollarlending-protections.
68
United States Underbanked Financial Services Are a $78 Billion Marketplace
That Encompasses Close to Two Dozen Products and Services Provided to Over 68
Million Consumers, 2011 UNDERBANKED MARKET SIZING STUDY, CTR. FIN. SERV.
INNOVATION
(Nov.
2012),
http://www.cfsinnovation.com/system/files/CFSI_201 1_Underbanked_Market_Sizing_S
tudy_November_2012.pdf (noting the Center for Financial Services Innovation ("CFSf')
claims to be "[T]he nation's leading authority on financial services for underserved
consumers. Through insights gained by producing original research; promoting cross
sector collaboration; advising organizations and companies by offering specialized
consulting services; shaping public policy; and investing in nonprofit organizations and
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3. Local Laws on High-Cost Lending
Some local communities, fed up with inaction or ineffective
action to curb payday loan abuses, 69 are taking matters into their
own hands. 70 Payday lending is a good subj ect for local reform. 71
The harms of high-cost loans are felt first in local communities,
where people borrow primarily to pay for day-to-day living
expenses. 72
In fact, "[l] ocal governments are often more motivated to fix
problems like this than are states or the federal government," and
local governments "are frequently more aware that these problems
exist." 73 Some see homelessness increase as result of p ayday loans
and other consumer-adverse loans. 74 Fueled by churches and other
benevolent organizations, some city officials sadly watch while
benevolence gifts from religious organizations and charities end
up in the hands of high-cost lenders rather than grocery stores
and landlords, a situation that concerns people of all political and
religious persuasions. 7 5
start-ups, CFSI delivers a deeply interconnected suite of services benefiting
underserved consumers."). See also Fahzy Abdul-Rahman, Small-Dollar Predatory
Lending and Bad Loans: Guide G-260, N.M. ST. U., COOPERATIVE EXTENSION SERV., C.
AGRIC. , CONSUMER & ENVTL SCI. 1 (Nov. 2012), http://aces.nmsu.edu/pubs/_g/G260.pdf
("Between 1992 and 2000, the number of predatory lenders in New Mexico grew from
one per 66,000 citizens to one for every 5,212 citizens.").
69 See Martin, Public Opinwn, supra note 11, at 269-73 (discussing a wide
variety of state and national polls that show broad public support for interest rate
caps). See, e.g., Joshua Cooper, Reassessing Payday Lenders in the Wake of Their Most
Negative Court Holding to Date, 18 J. CONSUMER & COMM. L. 15, 16 (2014) (describing
a consumer advocacy group's placement of ads against payday lenders on "Shark
Week," and comedian John Oliver's show "Last Week Tonight" as part of a growing
national movement to curb payday lending); Ted Seeger, Texas Cities Respond to
Payday Lending, 52 HOUSTON L. REV. 741, 753-58 (2014) (discussing failures of the
Texas legislature to combat payday loan abuses); Martin & Mayer, supra note 2, at
147-49 (providing examples of the options that local communities have when federal
lawmakers do not address payday lending).
70 Martin & Mayer, supra note 2, at 147-49 ("[D)iscuss[ing) the tools available to
local communities when state or federal lawmakers fail to act on issues of community
concern").
71 Peterson, Warning: Predatory Lender, supra note 44, at 932 (discussing local
officials' perceived need to step in and fill the gap causes by lax state and federal
payday loan regulations).
72 See PEW CHARITABLE TRUST, Payday Lending, supra note 5.
73 Martin & Mayer, supra note 2, at 149.
14 See id. at 173 n.168.
75 See id. at 162.
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As a result of concerns of this nature, nearly 250 local
municipalities nationwide were working to limit payday loan
abuses as of the fall of 2016. 76 While legal issues, such as
preemption, can limit the effectiveness of local action77 since state
law is supreme over local or municipal law on the same subject, 78
the vast majority of local payday loan ordinances (other than mere
licensing and registration) are zoning ordinances, which are
strictly within the purview of local governments. 79
Although zoning ordinances are safe from preemption
challenges, municipalities are by no means limited to zoning tools
in regulating payday loans. 80 Given that some states have not
regulated payday loans at all, there is often broad capacity for
municipalities to effect change beyond mere zoning.81 Cities and
counties can pass licensing and registration regulations,
moratoria and permanent bans on new loan establishments, and
permit regulations as well as caps on the total number of payday
lenders within a municipality or county through traditional zoning
powers.
Cities and counties can also limit the proximity of lenders in
relation to one another and to other uses, and they can set good
neighbor polices by setting limits on hours of operation and
requiring certain lighting and signage. 82 Municipalities may also
76
Telephonic interview with Steven Graves, February 6, 2018. (Professor Graves
keeps a database of all local ordinances as they are passed.).
77
The federal preemption doctrine comes from the U.S. Constitution. See U.S.
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (''This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding").
78 Griffith et al., supra note 21, at 37.
79 See id. at 17-36.
80 See id. at 12 (summarizing the many ways in which municipalities have
regulated payday lending, including moratoria on new payday lending while studying
the issue, permanent moratoria, limits on density and distance, and special permit
requirements, among others).
81
Other jurisdictions regulate piecemeal, leaving many opportunities for local
governments to fill in the blanks. For an excellent summary of these laws across the
Nation as of 2010, see NAT'L CONSUMER L. CTR., SMALL DOLLAR LOAN PRODUCT
SCORECARD-UPDATED (May 2010), http://consumersunion.org/pdf/Scorecard-5-1210.PDF.
82 See, e.g. , MESA, ARIZ., ZONING ORDINANCE § 11-6-3 (July 4, 2018) (specifying that
to receive a permit, a non-chartered financial institution must obtain any required
state licenses, meet the separation requirements, submit documentation showing that
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require distribution of information about local alternatives to
payday loans. 83 Finally, "municipalities can adopt D resolution[s
that] support state legislative efforts to curb the damaging effects
of payday lending on communities."84 In other words, local
governments can educate state legislatures about what ordinary
citizens actually want, which in effect shames state legislators
who are turning a blind eye to the problem. Local payday loan
ordinances were used very successfully for this purpose in Oregon,
after which the state regulated payday lenders and caused the
number of payday loan storefronts to drop from 329 to 81 in only
one year. 85

II.

SOCIO-GEOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND: BIFURCATED FINANCIAL
MARKETS, DISTANCE DECAY THEORY, AND LOCALIZATION
ECONOMIES

A. Bifurcated U. S. Financial Markets: How the
Other Half Banks
When it comes to interest rates, US financial markets are
currently bifurcated into two alternate systems owing to two
distinct socio-economic realities in America. The first is the
mainstream financial system that serves middle- and upper
income households. 86 A person in this segment, using traditional
financial services such as banks, might pay 10-18% on a short
term bank loan, 87 an average of 14-16% for a loan taken out on a
the site would be in compliance with all landscaping, parking, signage, and design
regulations, and demonstrate that it would be compatible with surrounding uses and
consistent with the general plan).
83
See Memorandum from James Zahradka, Supervising Attorney, Public Interest
Law Firm, Law Foundation of Silicon Valley, to City of Morgan Hill, 7 (Oct. 1, 2014),
at
available
http://www.morgan-hill.ca.gov/DocumentCenterNiew/14214/42Supplement-4?bidld=.
84
Martin & Mayer, supra note 2, at 153.
86 Bill Graves, Pay Days Loans in Oregon, NORTHWEST DEBT RELIEF LAW FIRM
(July 6, 2008), https://nwdrlf.com/pay-days-loans-in-oregon/.
86
Mehrsa Baradaran, How the Poor Got Cut Out of Banking, 62 EMORY L.J 483,
483 (2013).
67 Finance Rate on Personal Loans at Commercial Banks, ECONOMIC RESEARCH
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS (FRED), available at Interest Rates, ECONOMIC
RESEARCH
FEDERAL
RESERVE
BANK
OF
ST.
LOUIS,
at
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TERMCBCCALLNS, (last visited February 24, 2019).
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credit card, or 4-5% for a fixed rate 30-year real estate mortgage
loan. 88 In contrast, low-moderate-income individuals exist in a
post-Marquette financial system in which they borrow at rates of
300-1000% or more. 89 These two socio-economic realities could not
be more disparate. One would expect the disparity in interest
rates to reflect completely different universes, or at a minimum,
different countries. Both universes thrive in the U.S. with little in
between.
How high are usage rates for high-cost loan products? In
2013, 39. 3 % of all U.S. households used at least one of the
following types of alternative financial products: payday loans,
installment loans, title loans, pawn shops, refund anticipation
loans, rent-to-own services, non-bank money orders, non-bank
check cashing and non-bank remittances. 90 Not surprisingly,
people who use traditional banks use alternative financial
products less frequently. More specifically, unbanked households
use alternative financial services and products at the rate of
63.2% while households with traditional bank relationships use
these products j ust 21. 7% in 20 13. 9 1
People use alternative fi nancial services for a variety of
reasons, but they use alternative financial services most
frequently for recurring basic consumption needs and
convenience92-not emergencies. 93 This use, despite the huge
See id.
See Martin, supra notes 32-41 and accompanying text.
90
See e.g., Marianne Bertrand, Sendhil Mullainathan, & Eldar Shafir, Behavioral
Eonomics and Marketing in Aid of Decision Making Among the Poor, 25 J.PuB. POL'y &
MARKETING 8 (2006); Jane Cover, Amy F. Spring, & Rachel G. Kleit, Minorities on the
Margins? The Spatial Organization of Fringe Banking Services, 33 J. URB. AFF. 317,
318 (2011); Baradaran, supra note 84; Fowler et al., supra note 22, at 696; Ian M.
Dunham & Alec. Foster, Proximate Landscapes of Economic Inclusion in Southeastern
Pennsylvania, 67 PROF. GEOGRAPHER 132, 142 (2015).
91 2017 FDIC National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households,
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, at 15 (Oct. 2018), available at
88

89

https://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/201 7/2017 appendix.pd£.
92 Amanda Logan & Christian E. Weller, Who Borrows From Payday Lenders? An
Analysis of Newly Available Data, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 3, 11 (2009), available at
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/issues/2009/03/pdf/payday_lending
.pdf.
93 Gregory Elliehausen & Edward C. Lawrence, Payday Advance Credit in
America· An Analysis of Consumer Demand, CREDIT RESEARCH CTR. 28, 29 (2001),
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.200. 77 40&rep=epl&type=pdf
(claiming that 51% of payday borrowers made $25,000 - $50,000 a year and that an
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costs, can be explained by lack of financial literacy, 94 convenience
and friendliness of personnel in the lender's stores, 95 high costs of
and dissatisfaction with financial products and services that the
mainstream banks provide and mistrust of mainstream banks, 96
credit constraints, 97and diminished cognitive capacity due to
extreme financial distress. 9s
Most of the previous research on the spatial distribution of
alternative financial service providers has sought to determine
whether alternative financial service providers target at-risk and
vulnerable communities, including those with higher

alarming 77% of the payday loan users made over $25,000). Less than 72% of the
general population made an income this high three years later, according to Census
data.
See
Household
Income
in
the
United
States,
WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Household_income_in_the_U nited_States
(showing by
chart that 28.22% of the general population made $25,000 or less in 2003, meaning
that only 71.88% made more than $25,000 in 2003, three years after these gentlemen
gathered their data. Could the payday loan users actually be better off financially than
the population as a whole? This makes little sense.).
94 Marianne Bertrand & Adair Morse, Information Disclosure, Cognitive Biases,
and Payday Borrowing, 66 J. FIN. 1865, 1876-78 (201 1); Annamaria Lusardi & Carlo de
Bassa Scheresberg, Financial Literacy and High-Cost Borrowing in the United States
21-22 (NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RES., Working Paper No. 18969, April 2013),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w18969.
96 Ernesto Longa & Nathalie Martin, High-Interest Loans and Class: Do Payday
and Title Loans Really Serve the Middle Class?, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 524, 526
(2012).
96
See Michael S. Barr & Rebecca M. Blank, Savings, Assets, Credit, and Banking
Among Low-Income Households: Introduction and Overview, in INSUFFICIENT FuNDs:
SAVINGS, AsSETS, CREDIT, AND BANKING AMONG LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS 1, 3-5
(RUSSELL SAGE FOUNDATION 2008); Michael S. Barr, No SLACK: THE FINANCIAL LIVES
OF Low-INCOME AMERICAN 23-24 (BROOKINGS INSTITUTION PRESS 2012); see generally
John P. Caskey, FRINGE BANKING: CHECK-CASHING OUTLETS, PAWNSHOPS, AND THE
POOR (RUSSELL SAGE FOUNDATION 1984);
97
See, e.g., Neil Bhutta, Paige M. Skiba, & Jeremy Tobacman, Payday Loan
Choices and Consequences, 47 J. MONEY, CREDIT, AND BANKING 223 (2015); Lisa Servon
& Antonieta Castro-Cosio, Reframing the Debate About Financial Inclusion: Evidence
from an Up Close View of Alternative Financial Services, WASHINGTON, DC: BOARD OF
GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, ECONOMIC MOBILITY CONFERENCE,
2015,
https://www.stlouisfed.org/-/media/Files/PDFs/Community%20Development/Econ%20
Mobility/Sessions/ServonPaper508.pdf.
98 Sendhil Mullainathan & Eldar Shafir, Savings Policy and Decision-Making in
Low-Income Households, in INSUFFICIENT FUNDS: SAVINGS, ASSETS, CREDIT AND
BANKING AMONG Low-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS 121, 1 45 (RUSSELL SAGE FOUNDATION
2011).
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concentrations of low-income individuals and minorities. 99 This
research, bivariate or multivariate correlational in nature, has
determined that the alternative financial services industry is more
concentrated in low- to moderate-income communities but not in
the most impoverished areas. 1 00 Most of these studies hint at, but
do not actually prove, that low- to moderate-income consumers use
the alternative financial service industry more often when those
services are more densely located in their communities. 1° 1
When researchers have tried to determine whether
alternative financial service providers are filling a void in the
market left by more traditional service providers, t�e results have
been inconclusive. Some studies have found that alternative
financial service providers are more likely to be located in areas
where residents are underserved by traditional banks. 102 Other
studies found that the alternative financial service providers
typically coexist with traditional banks. 103 One study found that
whether or not alternative financial service providers coexist with
traditional banks depends on location. 104 Another study, which
used Euclidian distance from each census tract to the nearest
check cashing provider and bank location in southeastern
Pennsylvania, concluded that alternative financial service
providers and traditional banks normally serve communities of
different socioeconomic characteristics. 105
More recent research sheds light on how the density of
alternative financial service providers and state regulation of
payday lending are related to consumer use of alternative
99 Regarding minorities, see Graves, Landscapes, supra note 12, at 304; Temkin &
Sawyer, supra note 12, at 1-2; Tony Smith, Marvin M. Smith, & John Wackes,
Alternative Financial Service Providers and the Spatial Void Hypothesis, 38 REGIONAL
SCI. & URB. ECON. 205, 219-23 (2008); Alice Gallmeyer & Wade T. Roberts, Payday
Lenders and Economically Distressed Communities: A Spatial Analysis of Financial
Predation, 46 Soc. SCI. J. 521, 525-29 (2009); Cover, Spring, & Kleit, supra note 88, at
322-25 (2011); Neil Bhutta, Payday Loans and Consumer Financial Health, 47 J.
BANKING & FIN. 230, 242 (2014); Fowler et al., supra note 22, at 694-99; Dunham &
Foster, supra note 88, at 135-40 (2015).
100 T. Smith, M. Smith, & Wackes, supra note 97, at 219, 223.
101 See id at 223.
102 See id.
103 Temkin & Sawyer, supra note 12, at 3; Fowler et.al, supra note 22, at 688, 690.
104 Cover, Spring, & Kleit, supra note 88, at 339-41.
105 Dunham & Foster, supra note 88, at 136-40.
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· financial service providers. 106 Using the 2012 National Financial
Capability Study and restricted-use zip code files, scholars
Friedline and Kepple measured community density as the total
number of "auto title loans, payday loans, tax refunds, pawnshops,
or rent-to-own stores." 1 07 They then measured alternative
financial services loan usage and found that the higher the
density of alternative financial service providers, the more
consumers used the loans. 108
To date, no empirical study has investigated how far
consumers need to travel to access the nearest alternative
financial service provider, or whether the density of alternative
financial service providers within consumers' communities are
associated with consumers' use of alternative financial service.
Our study makes use of point addresses of consumers' residence
and payday lenders to precisely and accurately measure
accessibility in Euclidian distance. The methodology we use here
is an improvement over that used in previous studies. Our study
uses point addresses for its calculations. Additionally, the analysis
is performed using Euclidian distance, since consumers who have
zero lenders in their zip code or census tract may still live among
many payday lenders. We further improved on past methodologies
by including all payday lenders present just outside of the study
area of our research. 1 09 By controlling for proximity and density of
106 See Terri Friedline & Nancy Kepple, Does Community Access to Alternative
Financial Services Relate to Individuals' Use of These Services ? Beyond Individual
Explanations, 40 J. CONSUMER POL'Y 51, 59-61 (2017).
107 See id. at 58.
108 See id. at 66, 68. These authors found an increase in use of alternative financial

services among consumers with incomes at or greater than $15,000 ("modest- and
highest-income" groups), and that higher density of alternative financial service
providers was associated with "chronic use" of these lenders among consumers with
incomes less than $15,000 ("lowest-income" group). The study also found that state
prohibition of payday lenders provided protection for modest- and highest-income
consumers, but not so much for low-income consumers. See generally id.
109 Stan Openshaw, Developing GIS-Relevant Zone-Based Spatial Analysis Methods,
in PAUL LONGLEY AND MICHAEL BATTY, SPATIAL ANALYSIS: MODELLING IN A GIS
ENVIRONMENT 55-73 (WILEY 1996). This minimized the modifiable areal unit problem,
caused by eliminating store locations that are within the statistically significant
distance of a consumer because they fall just outside an artificial boundary. Focusing
on a locality, the data utilized for this study contains no heterogeneity of AFS
regulations, compositions of urban/rural, and zoning laws that would have affected
consumers' use of AFS. See id.
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traditional banks/credit unions, as well as individual-level
financial and household characteristics, the present study fills the
gap in the existing research on understanding how accessibility
influences payday loan use . 1 10
B. Distance Decay Theory and Localization Economies: Why
Payday Loans in the Neighborhood Matter in Theory

1 . Distance Decay Theory
While it is intuitively understood that greater distance from a
location limits our physical interaction with that location, this
concept is described theoretically as distance decay or sometimes
alternatively as the gravity model. Distance decay theory notes the
decline in interaction between places, ethnic groups, or any other
phenomena of interest as the distance between them increases . 1 1 1
Distance decay is often described using geographer Waldo Tobler's
first law of geography, namely that "everything is related to
everything else, but near things are more related than distant
things. " 112 While even Tobler admits that things are not always
this simple, 1 1 3 this maxim provides a meaningful starting point.
Thus, the spatial distribution of services (i.e., accessibility), along
with other individual factors, such as transportation availability,
ability to weigh multiple alternatives, and personal preference,
has a measurable effect on consumer use of those services.
Distance decay models have been used to examine a broad array of
human problems, including obesity and supermarket
availability, 1 1 4 criminal behavior and crime location, 11 5 and health

no See id.
111 See generally A S. Fotheringham,
Spatial Structure and Distance-Decay
Parameters, 7 1 ANNALS OF THE Ass'N OF AM. GEOGRAPHERS 426 (1981).
u2 Tobler, supra note 1, at 236.
n3 See id. at 234; see also Daniel Z. Sui, Tobler's First Law of Geography: A Big Idea
for a Small World?, 94 ANNALS OF THE ASS'N OF AM. GEOGRAPHERS 269, 269 (2004).
n• Paul L. Robinson et al., Does Distance Decay Modelling of Supermarket
Accessibility Predict Fruit and Vegetable Intake by Individuals in a Large Metropolitan
Area?, 24 J. HEALTH CARE FOR THE POOR & UNDERSERVED, 172, 173 (2013).
1 16 Sun Li ping, Yan Shaohong, Peng Yamian, & Yang Aimin, Criminal Incident
Predictwn Based on Geographical Profile, 6 J. CHEMICAL & PHARMACEUTICAL RES. 1,
1-7 (2014), available at http://jocpr.com/vol6-iss3-2014/JCPR-2014-6-3-1-7.pdf.
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disparities and availability of healthcare facilities. 1 16 Distance
decay theory suggests that consumers may be more likely to take
out a payday loan if there was a lender nearby due to the higher
frequency of interaction between the business and the consumer.
2. Density and Localization Economies
Localization economies refers to the grouping of certain types
of businesses near each other for the benefit of both the supply
and demand sides of the equation. Clustering certain activities (in
this case payday loan stores) may decrease the costs of labor and
materials. 11 7 For some businesses, being grouped together in
particular locations allows for a supply of suitable employees.
Additionally, nearness lowers the cost of infrastructure such as
telecommunications, parking lots, security, and the like. For
consumers, grouping these businesses together provides easier
access to multiple locations along with cheaper transportation
costs if they wish to compare rates or visit more than one location.
The assumption is that separating these stores will make it more
expensive and more difficult for consumers to locate and utilize
them.
Combining these concepts, one could assume that a consumer
would be more likely to make use of a payday loan if there was a
lender in near proximity to his or her home and if there are
convenient ways to use more than one location for comparison.
While localization economies may provide some benefits for
businesses and consumers, the high density of payday loan stores
and visible marketing also provides behavioral cues that
encourage use of alternative financial services. 1 18 In other words,
having a large number of lenders normalizes the practice of
charging 300- 1,000% interest.
Since considering the distance decay and localization
economies theories, our study was guided by two hypotheses.

116 Zoe M. McLaren, Cally Ardington, & Murray Leibbrandt, Distance Decay and
Persistent Health Care Dispariti,es in South Africa, 14 BMC HEALTH SERVS. RES. 1, 8
(2014).
117 See generally GORDON L. CLARK, MARYANN P. FELDMAN, MERIC S. GERTLER, &
DARIUSZ WOJCIK, THE NEW OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY 21-23
(OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 2018).
118 See generally Bertrand, Mullainathan, & Shafir, supra note 88.
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First, increases in distance of payday lenders from the consumers'
residences should be associated with a decreased likelihood of
payday loan use. Second, increases in density of payday lenders
should be associated with an increased likelihood of payday loan
use. Below, we describe how we tested these working hypotheses.
Ill. STUDY METHODOLOGY

This part describes the methodology for our study, some of
the study limitations, as well as the results of our study.

A. Sources of Data
This study utilized data collected from 289 C hapter 7
Bankruptcy filers who filed for bankruptcy in June 2005 in the
Middle D istrict (i.e., Baton Rouge, Louisiana) United States
Bankruptcy Court. The bankruptcy filers' home addresses, as well
as data on individual-level characteristics, were furnished in the
bankruptcy data. Because not all of the 289 addresses could be
retrieved or correctly geocoded in the GIS program, a subset of the
sample comprised of 172 households were included in the final
analyses. The only known available list of the population of U.S.
payday lender addresses, which was compiled in the year 2007,
was furnished by a geographer who has studied payday lending
neighborhoods. 11 e

B. Description of Baton Rouge
Our study was conducted in Louisiana, which does not limit
interest rate caps. As background, Louisiana has the second
highest rate (13.9 %) of unbanked and the seventh highest rate

119 Telephonic Interview with Steven Graves, June 2011. The authors were unable
to locate a list of the population of payday lender addresses for the year 2006. To
maintain consistency with the reference year (2007) of the list of payday lender
addresses, all addresses of regional banks and credit union locations, compiled for the
year 2007, for community-level control variables were obtained from the FDIC
Summary of Deposits (SOD) database and the Louisiana Corporate Credit Union
database. See Baton Rouge Credit Union Finder, CUWEB.ORG, available at
http://www.cuweb.org/cu_finder .htm#laf,
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(24. 5 %) of underbanked population in the United States. 120
Louisiana also has the ninth highest rate (7. 1 %, compared to the
national average of 4.7 %) of consumers who have ever used
payday loans. 121 We collected our data in the Baton Rouge
metropolitan area, which has similar demographic characteristics
to the rest of the state. 122
Figure 1 illustrates the agglomeration of payday lender
locations in the Baton Rouge metropolitan area (hereafter "Baton
Rouge") with respect to payday loan consumers in the sample. The
progressively darker areas show a progressively heavier
concentration of payday loan establishments. The red dots are the
homes of the consumers in our sample. Through Figure 1, we can
see the strong relationship between the home addresses . of the
bankruptcy debtors in our sample and the concentrations of
payday loan availability. The darker color zip code areas, which
show a higher concentration of payday lenders, correlate with the
higher concentration of consumers' homes.

120

201 7 FDIC National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households,
2018), available at

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, at 15 (Oct.
https://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/2017/2017appendix.pdf.

1 21 Addendum to thte 2011 FDIC National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked
Households, FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, (June 2013), available at
https: I lwww.fdic.gov I householdsurvey I 2013_afsaddendum_web.pdf.
122 See CORP. FOR ENTERPRISE DEV., The Most Unbanked Places in America (2011),

https://prosperitynow.org/blog/most-unbanked-places-america. Additionally, the FDIC's
National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households found that, in 2013, 7. 7%
of U.S. households are unbanked. However, 20.6% of African Americans, 17.9% of
Latinos, and 1 5.0% of Others (i.e., all remaining racial-ethnic groups) are unbanked. In
addition, the unbanked are more likely to be unmarried, have incomes of less than
$30,000, less than a high school education, and a foreign-born Spanish speaker than
the U.S. population as a whole. See 201 7 FDIC National Survey of Unbanked and
Underbanked Households, supra note 1 18.
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C. Payday Loan Consumers and Payday Lender Locations in
the Baton Rouge Metropolitan Area
1. Description of the Variables

In our study, we chose payday loan use as our dependent
variable. We used the Public Access to Court Electronic Records
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(PACER) system to search through the bankruptcy debtor's court
disclosures (specifically their schedules of assets and liabilities) to
find out if they had listed at least one payday loan among their
debts. We identified payday loan debts in the bankruptcy files by
correlating the names of creditors with those payday loan lenders
licensed by the state Office of Financial Institutions and/or
through the creditor's names, such as those including the terms
payday loan, payday lender, or check lender in the creditor name.
The first maj or independent variable we used was distance.
More specifically, we used the Euclidean distance or straight-line
distance in miles between the bankruptcy filers' home addresses
and the nearest payday lender. The second maj or independent
variable we used was density of payday loan stores, which we
measured by determining the number of payday lenders within a
1.5-mile radius of the bankruptcy filers' home addresses. To
compute the distance and density of payday lenders and their
proximity to the sample, the bankruptcy filers' home addresses
and a list of licensed payday lenders were geocoded (i.e.,
pinpointed) on a map of the locality using a program called
ArcGIS Desktop. 123
For the distance variable, we computed the Euclidean
distance in miles to ascertain the point-to-point distance between
the bankruptcy filers' home addresses and the nearest payday
lender. In order to make sure we chose the right distance for
measuring density, we placed the bankruptcy filers' home address
as the center of the circle for each debtor and then engaged in a
series of sensitivity tests to determine which increment of the
density-within-quarter-mile radius variable best modeled the
effect of density on the dependent variable. We tested 0.25 miles,
0.5 miles, and 0.75 miles, increasing incrementally by 0.25 miles
up to a maximum of 2.5 miles. We ultimately selected a radius of
1.5 miles as the independent variable because, of all of the density
independent variables, the model with this density-within-a-1.5
mile radius exhibited the highest model goodness-of-fit statistics
and independent variable t-test statistics we tested.
We built several statistical controls into our model, a series of
theoretically and empirically relevant community and individual123 We used release 10.3.1 of the program. See http://desktop.arcgis.com/en/.
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level variables. We measured the four community-level control
variables-bank distance, bank density, credit union distance, and
credit union density-in a manner consistent with the payday
lender distance and density variables. 124
Payday loan borrowers tend to be renters rather than
homeowners, single, and earn low incomes. 1 25
Therefore, dichotomous individual-level control variables
included the presence of homeownership and the status of being
married. Two continuous individual-level control variables
included in the analyses were the number of children present in
the bankruptcy filers' households and the income-to-needs ratios
(i.e., income divided by poverty threshold).

D. Statistical Strategy
Using Stata/SE 14. 1 software to analyze the data, we created
descriptive statistics for all of the variables. We created
frequencies and percentages for the dichotomous variables and
means and standard deviations for the continuous variables. We
used logistic regression to analyze the relationship between the
distance and density of payday lenders and payday loan use,
holding all else constant. We reported parameter estimates as
odds ratios, and we found statistical significance by one-tailed
tests of statistical significance levels less than an alpha-level of
0.05. We conducted Stata post-estimation to generate and graph
the predicted probabilities of payday loan use for each bankruptcy
filer for their values of payday distance, holding the other
variables constant. We also conducted this same post-estimation
process for the payday density variable.

124 Fowler et al., supra note 22, at 696. These bank and credit union variables were
separately entered because at least one study found that payday lenders were more
likely to be present "in counties that also have more traditional banks (but not more
credit unions)." Id.
126 Logan & Weller, supra note 90, at 1.
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Table 1:
Descriptive Statistics of the Subset of the Sample i n the Analyses (n = 1 72)

Variables

n (%)

Payday Loan Use
Payday Distance
(Miles)
Payday Density
(Within 1.5 Mile Radius)
Bank Distance
(Miles)
Bank Density
(1.5 Mile Radius)
Credit Union Distance
(Miles)
Credit Union Density
(Within 1.5 Mile Radius)
Home Ownership

32 (18.60)
2.46 (2.71)
3.31 (3.85)
3.35 (3. 32)
1.34 (1 .90)
7.00 (16.42)
0.64 (1.20)
131 (76. 16)
$34,005.49 ($27,224.22)
$29, 184.00*

Income
Married
Children

M (SD)

76 (44. 19)

0.76 (1.07)
* Denotes median value for non-normally distributed variables.

IV. STUDY RESULTS
A. Descriptive Results
Table 1 contains our descriptive statistics of the subset of
bankruptcy filer sample whose home addresses were geocoded. Of
the subset of 1 72 bankruptcy filers in the empirical analyses, 32
(18.60 %) had used payday loans. The sample lived within a mean
of 2.46 (SD = 2. 71) miles of the nearest payday lender and had a
mean of 3.31 (SD = 3.85) payday lenders within a 1.5-mile radius
of their home addresses. The bankruptcy filers lived within a
mean of 3. 35 (SD = 3.32) miles of the nearest bank and had a
mean of 1.34 (SD = 1.90) banks within a 1.5-mile radius of their
home addresses. The sample also lived within a mean of 7.00 (SD
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= 1 6.42) miles of the nearest credit union and had a mean of 0.64
(SD = 1 .20) credit unions with a 1 . 5-mile radius of their home
addresses. In terms of the individual-level control variables, three
quarters of the sample (n = 131, 76. 16 %) owned a home. The
sample's mean and median incomes were $34,005.49 (SD =
$27,2 24.22) and $29, 184.00, respectively. A little over two-fifths (n
= 76, 44. 19 percent) of the bankruptcy filers were married, and in
terms of children, the sample had a mean of 0.76 (SD = 1.07)
children.
Table 2

Logistic Regression Results
Variables
Payday Distance
Payday Density
Bank Distance
Bank Density
Credit Union Distance
Credit Union Density
Homeownership
Married
Children
Income-to-Needs Ratio

OR

0. 73*
1. 15**
1.01
0.96
0.99
0. 79
0. 25**
1.44
1.60*
1.05

x

2

*p < .05. **p < .01

z

-1.66
2. 49
0.05
-0.32
-0.31
- 1. 1 8
-2.62
0.70
2.20
0.37

= 23.84** (p = 0.008)

C. Quantitative Empirical Results
Table 2 presents results of logistic regression. The major
independent variables and a couple of control variables
significantly predicted payday loan use in the distance and density
concurrent model, as evidenced by a significant chi-square
statistic (x.2 = 23.84, p < 0.01, Pseudo R2 = 0. 14). We found that an
increase in distance of payday lenders from the bankruptcy filers'
home addresses was associated with a decreased likelihood of
payday loan use (Odds Ratio [OR] = 0.73, z = - 1.66, p < 0.05). We
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further found that increases in density of payday lenders within
1.5 miles of the bankruptcy filers' home addresses were associated
with an increased likelihood of payday loan use (OR = 1.15, z =
2.49, p < 0.0 1).
Our study dataset matched up consistently with many prior
studies on homeownership (OR = 0.25, z = -2.62, p < 0.01), which
significantly predicted decreases in the likelihood of payday loan
use, while increases in the number of children (OR = 1.60, z =
2.20, p < 0.05) significantly predicted increases in the likelihood of
payday loan use. The remainder of the control variables, bank
density, bank distance, credit union density, and credit umon
distance did not significantly predict payday loan use. 1 26

126 Bank distance (OR = 1.01, z = 0.05), bank density (OR = 0.96, z = -0.32), credit
union distance (OR = 0.99, z = -0.31), credit union density (OR = 0.79, z = -1.18),
marital status (OR = 1.44, z = 0.70), and income-to-needs ratios (OR = 1.05, z = 0.37).
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D. The Distance Decay Function
We generated two graphs using the Stata post-estimation
functions. Figure 2, the Distance Decay Function, demonstrated
that increases in payday distance are associated with decreases in
the predicted probability of payday loan use when holding all
other variables constant. The predicted probability of payday loan
use for filers who live close to payday lenders was approximately
0.24. 127 Figure 3 shows the Localization Economies Function.
More specifically, Figure 3 shows that increases in payday density
are associated with increases in the predicted probability of
payday loan use. The predicted probability of payday loan use for
127 This probability drops to about 0.18 at one-mile from the nearest payday lender
and decreases at a smaller rate for each mile increase in distance thereafter.
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filers who live within communities dense with payday lenders
increases almost linearly for each unit increase in payday density.

Figure 3

The Localization Economics Function
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E. The Localization Economics Function
Several scholars have noted the way in which low- and
moderate -income households use alternative financial services
creates an equity or environmental justice issue. 128 This results
from a lack of access to better alternatives at traditional banking
institutions. 1 29 In an attempt to address the geographically
uneven distribution of alternative financial services, previous
128 Timothy Bates & Constance R. Dunham, Introduction to Focus Issue: Use of
Financial Services by Low-Income Households, 17 ECON. DEV. Q. 3, 6 (2003).
129 See id.
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studies have attempted to answer whether the alternative
financial services industry strategically locates its storefronts in
neighborhoods with consumers predominantly of a lower
socioeconomic status and minority composition for the particular
purpose of filling the void after traditional banks have left.

F. Study Limitations
While this is the first study that examined the association
between the distance and density of payday lenders and consumer
use of payday loans using point addresses and controlling for
accessibility of mainstream banks and credit unions, this study
has several limitations. First, this study used non-representative
cross-sectional data and cannot establish causality. While the
C hapter 7 bankruptcy filers' data offers a unique advantage of
furnishing point addresses of filers with detailed accounts of AFS
use, the data may have contained a more socioeconomically
disadvantaged segment of population; particularly given that
bankruptcy debtors have more income volatility than average
A mericans. Bankruptcy debtors also tend to be middle-class
rather than the working poor, a fact that may make up for this
income volatility in the sample.
Furthermore, 40% of the sample had missing addresses and
were more likely to be more disadvantaged with lower incomes
and higher use of payday loans. Second, due to a small sample
size, the authors of this study could not conduct group analyses
based on income as Friedline and Kepple had accomplished in
their study. 13° Future studies with a larger sample size may
consider analyzing data on different income groups. Third, while it
is common to utilize different data sources of different reference
years, due to limited data availability, 131 this study used consumer
data of 2005 as compared to addresses of payday lenders and
banks and credit unions of 2007. Thus, bias could have been
introduced based on the extent to which the location of consumers,
payday lenders, and banks and credit unions changed between
2005 and 2007. Fourth, due to the unavailability of data, this
study did not control for other unobserved variables, such as age,
13° Friedline & Kepple, supra note 104, at 58.
13 1 Fowler et al., supra note 22, at 696-97.
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race, gender, financial literacy, unexpected hardships, and comfort
level with other barriers to mainstream banks, which may have
affected payday loan use. The authors attempted to overcome
some of the data limitations in the following ways. While federal
bankruptcy courts do not require filers to enter gender when
filing, the authors used filers' names to create a gender variable.
The inclusion of a gender variable in the models neither improved
model fit nor was it a significant factor to determine payday loan
use. The authors additionally explored how the inclusion of
homeownership may have served as a proxy for some of the
missing variables, (e.g., race and ethnicity) as evidenced by U.S.
census data which revealed clear differences in homeownership
rates by race and ethnicity. 132

G. Other Study Implications on Related Subjects
As demonstrated in this study, homeownership was
significantly related to decreases in the likelihood of payday loan
use. This finding demonstrated that homeownership was a
protective factor against payday loan use, which was consistent
with previous studies. 133 Policymakers should look to implement
policies that build consumers' financial asset portfolios, encourage
the purchase of homes and the development of other financial
assets, such as bank savings accounts, and to curb the use of
costly alternative financial services such as payday loans. 134

It is worthwhile to consider two findings on the presence of
children and the accessibility of traditional banks and credit
unions. First, findings showed that increases in the number of
children were associated with increases in the likelihood of payday
loan use. There appears to be added costs for the added number of
children that is not captured by income-to-needs ratio (i.e., income
divided by poverty thresholds). For instance, a household may
132 Quarterly Residential Vacancies and Homeownership, First Quarter 201 7, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU (2017), https://www.census.gov/housing/hvs/files/qtrl 17/Ql 17press.pdf
188 Younghee Lim et al., The Role of Middle-Class Status in Payday Loan
Borrowing: A Multivariate Approach, 59 Soc. WORK 329, 335 (2014).
134 See generally Julie Birkenmaier & Sabrina Watson Tyuse, Affordable Financial
Services and Credit for the Poor: The Foundation of Asset Building, 13 J. COMMUNITY
PRAC. 69 (2005); Sherraden et al., FIN. CAPABILITY AND AsSET DEV.: RES., EDUC., POL'Y,
& PRAC. 3-43 (Oxford University Press 2013).
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have enough income to escape extreme material hardship in the
context of federally-defined poverty. Nevertheless, the household
may not have enough to cover other expenses incurred by
unexpected medical and other needs due to financial
vulnerability. 1 35
Second, accessibility of traditional banks and credit unions
indicated by distance and density of those establishments was not
a significant factor in determining payday loan use. It may be that
the low- to moderate-income consumers in the study are extremely
economically disadvantaged, and they have low credit scores or no
credit history to take advantage of banks and credit union
accessibility. It also may be that low- to moderate-income
consumers have no incentives to use bank products because of
negative prior experiences with bank products and personnel,
and/or they lack knowledge of the affordable products offered by
community-based credit unions. Future research should further
investigate what the accessibility of traditional banks and credit
unions means for low- to moderate-income consumers.

CONCLUSION
Access to payday loans increases the likelihood of using
payday loans. Snowballing payday loan debt can strip financially
vulnerable consumers of opportunities to develop assets, hamper
convenient access to traditional and non-predatory banking
products marketed to unbanked and underbanked consumers, and
reduce low- to moderate-income consumers' abilities to save and
acquire wealth. More research is needed to better understand the
causal mechanisms through which the accessibility of payday
lenders and regulations of the payday lending industry impacts
consumers' use of payday loans, as well as the social welfare
implications of payday loan use among consumers in the local
economy. Deeper, macroeconomic reasons why consumers use
alternative financial services also need to be addressed including
declining wages, 1 36 a greater reliance on credit and the

135 Trey Bickham & Younghee Lim, In Sickness and in Debt: Do Mounting Medical
Bills Predict Payday Loan Debt?, 54 SOC. WORK IN HEALTH CARE 518, 527 (2015).
136 Younghee Lim et al., ,supra note 1 31, at 335-36.
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disappearance of small dollar credit, 137 and increased mcome
volatility. 138
In the meantime, however, mayors, and city council members
should use their zoning power wisely in light of our study results.
Our study is the first study to investigate the relationship
between distance of payday lenders and consumers' residence.
Until now, there has been no empirical data investigating the
relationship between spatial distribution of payday lenders and
consumers' use of alternative financial services. Here, we close
this gap and provide useful data on how distance and density of
alternative fmancial services is associated with consumers'
likelihood of alternative financial service use.
We do this by testing two hypotheses. Consistent with
distance decay theory, our first major finding revealed that
increases in the distance of payday lenders from the consumers'
home addresses were associated with a decreased likelihood of
payday loan use. Consistent with the localization economies
framework, our second major finding revealed that increases in
the density of payday lenders within 1.5 miles of the consumers'
home addresses were associated with an increased likelihood of
payday loan use.
The second finding on the association between density of
payday lenders and payday loan use is consistent with the
previous research findings on density of AFS and AFS use. More
specifically, a higher density of AFS storefronts (e.g. , auto title
loans, payday loans, tax refunds, pawn shops, and rent-to-own
stores) were related to more frequent AFS use. 139 Considering that
higher density can be attributed to lax laws at the local or state
level, this finding suggests that more lenient payday loan laws
increase consumer use of loans: 140
Future research should more carefully examine how local
ordinances (namely the regulation of payday distance and density)
impact payday loan use, controlling for other factors influencing
consumer use of payday loans. Given that there are approximately
Baradaran, supra note 84, at 533-34.
Younghee Lim et al., supra note 131, at 335 (2014); Servan & Castro-Cosio,
supra note 95, at 14-18.
139 Friedline & Kepple, supra note 104, at 71-72 (2017).
140 McKernan et al., supra note 20, at 217.
137

138
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250 local ordinances pertaining to payday distance and density, 141
new research to measure the impact of such ordinances would be
very useful.
Regardless of what future researchers find, however, the
findings of this study imply important considerations for
policymakers in locales. Many localities have ruled that payday
lenders must be at least 500ft. (0.09 miles) away from residential
areas. 142 According to our study results, however, the 500ft.
threshold may be inadequate. Consumer use of payday loans
decreases sharply up to the first 3 miles (15,840ft.) of distance
from residence and thereafter decreases more gradually (see
Figure 2). In a similar vein, this study found that density at a 1.5mile (7,920ft.) radius is most significant in predicting consumer
use of payday loans (see Figure 3). Local governments that wish to
implement payday loan ordinances to effectively reduce consumer
use of payday loans should carefully consider the changes in the
effect of payday loan use as miles increase and as density
increases within a 1.5-mile radius.
Above all, localities that wish to limit residents' use of
payday loans should carefully examine how ordinances of distance
and ordinances of density may interact and examine what kinds of
ordinance combinations will yield the best outcomes for residents'
well-being. Mayors, city council members, and city planners can
help consumers by using their local zoning and regulatory power
to carefully consider whether to allow payday lending in their
cities and towns. The businesses located near our homes have a
deep abiding influence on us, and those in control of those
business locales have the power to change lives.

141 Telephonic interview with Steven Graves, February 5, 2018 (Professor Graves
keeps a database of all local ordinances as they are passed.).
142 Martin & Mayer, supra note 2, at 1 52-53.

